



ohn Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) is the latest in a line of great British
economists who had a profound inﬂuence on the discipline of economics.
By common consent, the line starts with Adam Smith (1723–1790), whose
Wealth of Nations (1776) is generally regarded as the founding document of
modern economics. It continues with David Ricardo (1772–1823), whose Prin-
ciples of Political Economy (1817) dominated classical economics for much
of the nineteenth century, and, incidentally, provided Karl Marx with one of
his central concepts: the labor theory of value. John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873)
Principles of Political Economy, published in the same year, 1848, as the Com-
munist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, became the standard textbook in the
English-speaking world—and beyond—for decades. William Stanley Jevons’s
(1835–1882) Theory of Political Economy (1871) inaugurated the “marginal
revolution,” which replaced, or supplemented, emphasis on cost of production
(supply) as determining value with emphasis on utility (demand). He resolved
the classic diamond-water paradox—diamonds are a luxury, water a necessity,
yet diamonds command a higher price than water—by showing that “marginal
utility”—the utility gained from having one more unit of something—not “total
utility” plays the key role in determining price. Alfred Marshall (1842–1924),
Keynes’s own teacher, guide, and patron, dominated economics in the English-
speaking world from the publication of the ﬁrst edition of his classic, Principles
of Economics (1890), to the 1930s.
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Keynes clearly belongs in this line. In listing “the” classic of each of these
great economists, historians will cite the General Theory as Keynes’s path-
breaking contribution. Yet, in my opinion, Keynes would belong in this line
even if the General Theory had never been published. Indeed, I am one of a
small minority of professional economists who regard his Tract on Monetary
Reform (1923), not the General Theory, as his best book in economics. Even
after sixty-ﬁve years, it is not only well worth reading but continues to have a
major inﬂuence on economic policy.
1. KEYNES’S LIFE
From 1908 to his death in 1946, Keynes was an active Fellow of King’s College,
Cambridge, inﬂuencing successive generations of students. For many years, he
was also Bursar of King’s College, and is credited with making it one of the
wealthiest of the Cambridge colleges. From 1911 to 1944, he was the editor
or joint-editor of the Economic Journal, at the time the leading professional
economic periodical in the English-speaking world. Simultaneously, he was
also Secretary of the Royal Economic Society.
Despite his lifelong commitment to economics, the earliest work he
completed—though not the earliest to be published—was in mathematics not
economics—A Treatise on Probability—essentially completed by 1911, but
ﬁrst published in 1921. It is a mark of Keynes’s range, creative originality, and
insight that much recent work in statistics has returned to the themes of the
Treatise on Probability. In economics, his ﬁrst major publication was Indian
Currency and Finance (1913), a product of his service in the India Ofﬁce of
the British government from 1906 to 1908.
Monetary Reform (1923) was followed in 1930 by the two-volume Treatise
on Money, much of which remains of value, though Keynes himself came to
regard its theoretical analysis as simply a step on the road to the General Theory,
the last of his major works. These major works were supplemented by numerous
articles, reviews, and biographical essays on some of his predecessors.1
Keynes’s interest and inﬂuence were by no means limited to the conﬁnes
of the academy. For decades he exerted a major inﬂuence on public affairs and
played an active role in the world of business. His Economic Consequences
of the Peace (1919), based on his activities as an adviser to the British Trea-
sury during the negotiation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, had a major impact
on public opinion and public policy, not only in Britain but throughout the
world, and not only immediately. It was translated into many languages, be-
came a worldwide best-seller, and ﬁrst established Keynes as a major public
1 The biographical essays on economists are gathered together in his Essays in Biography
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ﬁgure. It inﬂuenced the reaction of both victors and vanquished to the Versailles
Peace Treaty. Indeed, in a book, The Carthaginian Peace; or, the Economic
Consequences of Mr. Keynes, published more than two decades later (1946),
Etienne Mantoux pays the Economic Consequences a backhanded compliment
by arguing that Keynes’s debunking of the peacemakers was the source of all
subsequent evil, including World War II.
From 1919 on, Keynes remained active in public matters, publishing a
steady stream of articles on current affairs in nonprofessional journals and news-
papers, advising and participating in the deliberations of the Liberal party, serv-
ing as chairman of the Nation and Athenaeum when it was acquired by a group
of Liberals in 1922, and later as director of the combined New Statesman and
Nation, leading journals of opinion for which he wrote frequently. He brought
together many of his most signiﬁcant pieces on public affairs in Essays in Per-
suasion (1931). He served on government commissions, notably the Macmillan
Commission, and advised and consulted with successive governmental minis-
ters. He was chairman of the National Mutual Insurance Company and director
of several other insurance companies. His interests were truly catholic: E. A. G.
Robinson, who was co-editor of the Economic Journal with Keynes for some
years and succeeded him as editor, begins an Encyclopaedia Britannica article
on Keynes by describing him as “1st Baron . . . , British economist who revo-
lutionized economic theories, critic and architect of national economic policies,
political essayist, successful ﬁnancier, bibliophile and patron of the arts.” His
interest in one particular art, ballet, was both cause and effect of his marriage in
1925 to Lydia Lopokova, a famous Russian ballerina. He established and largely
ﬁnanced the Cambridge Arts Theater and was a trustee of the National Gallery.
From 1919 to World War II, Keynes’s connection with government was
primarily as an inﬂuential outsider. From 1940 on, he served in government
in a variety of capacities concerned with the economic conduct of the war
and postwar reconstruction. He was the chief British representative at Bretton
Woods in 1944, where he was a major architect of the plans for the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He
was the chief negotiator of the large U.S. loan to Britain in 1945. On his return
to Britain, he played an important role in persuading the British Parliament to
adopt the Bretton Woods agreement. He died shortly thereafter, on April 21,
1946.
2. THE INFLUENCE OF THE GENERAL THEORY
To return to the General Theory: its inﬂuence on both economic thinking and
economic practice was profound. The “Keynesian revolution” was far more
than a ﬁgure of speech. From shortly after the publication of the book in 1936
to at least the 1960s, the majority of professional economists, and certainly4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the most prominent, termed themselves “Keynesians.” Those who called them-
selves non- or anti-Keynesians were a beleaguered minority, supplemented, it
must be said, by some important writers on economics who were not mem-
bers of the professional guild.2 Governments around the world hastened to
adopt “Keynesian policies,” though many an economist—both Keynesians and
anti-Keynesians—regarded some of the policies, particularly when they led to
inﬂation, as at best “bastard Keynesianism.”3
As of this writing (1988), the status and inﬂuence of the book has changed.
It continues to have a major inﬂuence on economic thinking and economic pol-
icy, and will long continue to do so, but for very different reasons and in a very
different way than it did initially. The catalyst for the change was the inﬂation
and stagﬂation of the 1970s. As Robert Lucas wrote in 1981, “Proponents
of a class of models which promised 31/2 to 41/2 percent unemployment to a
society willing to tolerate annual inﬂation rates of 4 to 5 percent have some
explaining to do after a decade such as we have gone through [i.e., the 1970s,
when inﬂation rose to 16 percent and unemployment to 8 percent in the United
States, and to 30 percent and 6 percent in the U.K. Inﬂation rose as high as 25
percent in Japan and 7 percent in Germany, though unemployment remained
relatively low]. A forecast error of this magnitude and central importance to
policy has consequences, as well it should.”
The predictions to which Lucas refers were based on the so-called Phillips
curve which linked inﬂation inversely to unemployment—allegedly, the higher
the rate of inﬂation, the lower the level of unemployment. The curve was
asserted by many Keynesians to be stable over time and to specify a menu of
combinations of inﬂation and unemployment, any of which was attainable by
the appropriate monetary and ﬁscal policy. Lucas went on to note that “in the
late 1960s Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund Phelps (1968) had argued . . .
that these predicted Phillips curve trade-offs were spurious.” They emphasized
the importance of distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated inﬂa-
tion in interpreting the Phillips curve, and Friedman introduced the concept of
a “natural rate of employment” to which the economy would tend as economic
actors adjusted their anticipations.
“The central forecast to which [Friedman’s and Phelps’s] reasoning led,”
Lucas continued, “was a conditional one, to the effect that a high-inﬂation
decade should not have less unemployment on average than a low-inﬂation
decade. We got the high-inﬂation decade, and with it as clear-cut an
2 In the U.S., the most important was doubtless Henry Hazlitt, The Failure of the New
Economics: An Analysis of the Keynesian Fallacies (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1959).
3 The phrase was coined by Joan Robinson, one of the earliest and most dedicated members
of Keynes’s inner circle, in her review of Harry Johnson’s Money, Trade and Economic Growth
(1962), Economic Journal, vol. 72 (September 1962), p. 690. However, she used it to refer to the
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experimental discrimination as macro-economics is ever likely to see, and
Friedman and Phelps were right.”4
The 1980s have been no kinder to the earlier Keynesian models. In the
U.S., inﬂation was brought down drastically, accompanied by a temporary
increase in unemployment to a peak of nearly 11 percent—a short-term re-
action to unanticipated disinﬂation along Phillips curve lines. But then, from
1983 on, unemployment fell concurrently with further declines in inﬂation,
reaching 6 percent by the end of 1987 when inﬂation was about 4 percent—a
ﬂat contradiction of the asserted negative relation between unemployment and
inﬂation embodied in the Phillips curve. In the U.K., too, an initial decline in
inﬂation was accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment, which was very
much slower to decline but has more recently begun to do so. In Germany,
inﬂation has come down since the early 1980s; unemployment rose initially,
as in the U.S. and the U.K., but, in contrast to them, continued to rise after
inﬂation had settled down, and has remained high. Japan, which was the ﬁrst
of the major countries to cut sharply the rate of inﬂation, has succeeded in
keeping inﬂation low with little change in its recorded unemployment rate.
All in all, this experience is hardly consistent with a stable trade-off between
inﬂation and unemployment.
Experience led to disillusionment with initial Keynesianism on the part not
only of professional economists but also of policymakers. The most dramatic
evidence came from James Callaghan, when he was the Labour prime minister
of the U.K.—the party and the country that had gone farthest in embracing and
adopting Keynesian policies. Said Callaghan in 1976, “We used to think that
you could just spend your way out of a recession and increase employment
by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you, in all candour,
that that option no longer exists; and that insofar as it ever did exist, it only
worked by injecting bigger doses of inﬂation into the economy followed by
higher levels of unemployment as the next step. That is the history of the past
twenty years.”
Despite the widespread rejection of some of the key propositions that
constituted the “Keynesian revolution,” the book continues to have a major
impact on economic thinking. Some indication of its inﬂuence is given by the
continuing citations to the book in the professional literature. Data from one
citation index, which covers a wide range of economic journals, are available
for sixteen years, 1972 to 1987. In all, there were 1,558 citations to the General
Theory, or an average of nearly 100 a year. Of the total, 729 occurred in the
ﬁrst eight years, 829 in the second eight, so there is no sign that interest in the
book is declining. However, the character of the book’s inﬂuence has changed.
4 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., “Tobin and Monetarism: A Review Article,” Journal of Economic
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Some years ago, I remarked to a journalist from Time magazine, “We are all
Keynesians now; no one is any longer a Keynesian.” In regrettable journalist
fashion, Time quoted the ﬁrst half of what I still believe to be the truth, omitting
the second half. We all use Keynesian terminology; we all use many of the
analytical details of the General Theory; we all accept at least a large part of the
changed agenda for analysis and research that the General Theory introduced.
However, no one accepts the basic substantive conclusions of the book, no one
regards its implicit separation of nominal from real magnitudes as possible or
desirable, even as an analytical ﬁrst approximation, or its analytical core as
providing a true “general theory.”
As one, no doubt somewhat idiosyncratic, view of the book, I quote from
a reply that I wrote some years ago to criticisms of my work mostly from a
“Keynesian” point of view:
“One reward from writing this reply has been the necessity of rereading earlier
work, in particular [Keynes’s] . . . General Theory. The General Theory is
a great book, at once more naive and more profound than the ‘Keynesian
economics’ that Leijonhufvud contrasts with the ‘economics of Keynes.’ . . .5
“I believe that Keynes’s theory is the right kind of theory in its simplicity,
its concentration on a few key magnitudes, its potential fruitfulness. I have
been led to reject it, not on these grounds, but because I believe that it has
been contradicted by evidence: its predictions have not been conﬁrmed by
experience. This failure suggests that it has not isolated what are ‘really’ the
key factors in short-run economic change.
“The General Theory is profound in the wide range of problems to which
Keynes applies his hypothesis, in the interpretations of the operation of mod-
ern economies and, particularly, of capital markets that are strewn throughout
the book, and in the shrewd and incisive comments on the theories of his
predecessors. These clothe the bare bones of his theory with an economic
understanding that is the true mark of his greatness.
“Rereading the General Theory has . . . reminded me what a great econ-
omist Keynes was and how much more I sympathize with his approach and
aims than with those of many of his followers.”6
3. THE MESSAGE OF THE GENERAL THEORY
As its title indicates, the General Theory is almost pure abstract theory. There
is only passing reference to applied economics, statistical magnitudes, or eco-
nomic policy. Yet, like all of Keynes’s writings on economics, it was inspired
by a major contemporary problem and written in the hope and expectation
5 Axel Leijonhufvud, On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes (London:
Oxford University Press, 1968).
6 Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework: A Debate with His Critics, ed. by Robert J.
Gordon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 133–34.M. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 7
of providing a solution. The book was written during the worldwide Great
Depression following 1929, when idle men, idle machines, and unmet demand
coexisted on a large scale for years on end and produced widespread poverty,
misery, and deprivation. For Britain, it followed a near-decade of economic
stagnation, high unemployment, and long-term dependence of many families
on a government dole. The key problem of the time was how to explain the
apparent paradox, and, more urgently, how to resolve it.
Ups and downs in economic activity involving occasional periods of wide-
spread unemployment had long occurred and had engaged the attention of
numerous economists under the rubric of “business ﬂuctuations,” or “business
cycles.” Various theories had been offered to explain them. Most earlier theories
implicitly accepted the proposition that a private-enterprise capitalist system
contained self-correcting forces that would keep disturbances temporary. By
corrective adjustments to changes in circumstances, the system, it was believed,
would tend toward full employment of both men and machines—save only for
fractional and transitory unemployment implicit in a dynamic economy. How-
ever, the long duration and magnitude of the unemployment during the Great
Depression and the prior years in Britain did not seem to ﬁt this pattern. Could
these be interpreted as simply a temporary, if long-lasting, disturbance? Or did
they indicate a defect in the supposed self-adjusting forces at work, so that
the economy could get stuck for long periods of time at a position of high
unemployment—a position that might have just as much reason to be regarded
as an “equilibrium” as a position of full employment?
Such a possibility had frequently been asserted by socialist and other crit-
ics of a capitalist system, whom the mainline professional economists had
regarded as “crackpots.” Keynes took the possibility seriously and proceeded
to construct an hypothesis that he believed demonstrated the possibility—indeed
the frequent reality—that, without government intervention, a private-enterprise
capitalist system using a non-commodity money would tend toward a position
characterized by a high level of involuntary unemployment of persons who
would willingly be employed at the current wage rate but could not ﬁnd jobs.
The classical remedy for idle men, according to Keynes, was a decline in
the real wage rate, which would reduce the number of persons seeking jobs
and increase the number of persons employers wanted to hire. The classical
remedy for idle machines was a reduction in the cost to enterprises of using
and producing such machines, and that was expected to occur via a reduction
in the real interest rate.
In the 1920s and 1930s in Britain, these classical remedies seemed either
inoperative or ineffective. Keynes set himself the task of explaining why, of
constructing an alternative theory that would both explain what was happening
and justify alternative policies—such as the large public works programs he
had been recommending since the mid-1920s.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In one sense, his approach was strictly Marshallian: in terms of demand
and supply. However, whereas Marshall dealt with speciﬁc commodities and
“partial equilibrium,” Keynes proposed to deal with what he called “aggregate
demand” and the “aggregate supply function,” and with general not partial
equilibrium.
Where he deviated from Marshall was in the key variables that he regarded
as producing equilibrium between demand and supply and in the process of ad-
justment to a change in demand or supply. In Marshallian analysis, the key role
was played by prices, which reacted quickly to any change in circumstances. Let
there be a sudden increase in demand, in the sense of a demand function relat-
ing the quantity demanded to price. In Marshall’s view, the immediate reaction
would be on prices, which would rise to choke off the quantity demanded to the
prior level plus whatever additional quantities might be made available from in-
ventories. The rise in prices during the “market period” would give producers an
incentive to increase output in the “short run” by using existing plant and equip-
ment more intensively, and, if the increased demand persisted, in the longer run
by adding to plant and equipment. In short, prices adjusted rapidly, quantities
slowly, and changes in prices played the major role in producing equilibrium.
To Keynes, it seemed clear that this process had been inoperative or ineffec-
tive with respect to the economy as a whole. Nominal wage rates had indeed
declined, but so had nominal prices, so that real wages had hardly moved,
and may indeed have increased. He concluded that movements in prices and
interest rates could not be counted on. Accordingly, he reversed Marshall’s
presumptions: prices of labor and capital, at least “real wages” and “real in-
terest rates,” are very slow to adjust; quantities, which is to say consumption,
investment, and their sum, total output, are highly ﬂexible and adjust rapidly.
Changes in output (aggregate supply), not in prices, play the major role in
producing equilibrium. Accordingly, as a ﬁrst approximation—though one he
never really relaxed—he took prices as given by forces outside his analysis.
As a ﬁrst approximation, also, he abstracted from both government spending
and international trade, but these could readily be integrated into the analysis
without affecting its substance.
Keynes deﬁned aggregate demand and aggregate supply in terms of
employment, in line with his view that he was developing a “theory of em-
ployment.” However, both Keynes and his followers tended to replace em-
ployment by output and to express aggregate demand and aggregate supply
in terms of the value of output demanded by the public and supplied by
enterprises.
Aggregate demand, in these terms, is the sum of expenditures on con-
sumption goods and expenditures on investment goods. Keynes regarded ex-
penditures on consumption as depending on income, introducing one of his
key concepts: the propensity to consume, or, in his words, “the functional
relationship . . . between . . . a given level of income in terms of wage-M. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 9
units, and . . . the expenditure on consumption out of that level of income.”
A “fundamental psychological law,” which plays a key role in the Keynesian
system, is that “men are disposed . . . to increase their consumption as their
income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their income”—i.e.,
the “marginal propensity to consume” is less than unity.7
Keynes deﬁned investment as “the current addition to the value of the cap-
ital equipment which has resulted from the productive activity of the period.”
He regarded investment as depending on the “marginal efﬁciency of capital,”
the second of his key concepts, which he deﬁned as “that rate of discount which
would make the present value of the series of annuities given by the returns
expected from the capital-asset during its life just equal to its supply price,”
i.e., “the cost of producing” one more unit of the asset. Like the propensity to
consume, the marginal efﬁciency of capital is a function or schedule relating
the amount of investment to the interest rate, since entrepreneurs would have
an incentive to add to investment so long as the yield exceeded the interest rate
at which they could borrow the funds to ﬁnance the investment.8
The interest rate, in turn, he regarded as determined by “liquidity pref-
erence,” the third of his key concepts. “An individual’s liquidity-preference
is given by a schedule of the amounts of his resources, valued in terms of
money or of wage-units, which he will wish to retain in the form of money
in different sets of circumstances.” He regarded the amount of their assets that
individuals would want to hold in the form of money as depending on both
income and the interest rate—income because that would affect the amount
held for “transactions- and precautionary-motives,” the interest rate, because
that would affect the amount held “to satisfy the speculative-motive.”9
If, as Keynes did, we let Y be income, identical with the value of output,
C be consumption, I be investment, L liquidity preference, M the quantity of
money, and r the interest rate, then aggregate demand is given by
Y = C(Y) + I(r), (1)
and the demand for money by
M = L(Y,r). (2)
In line with his implicit assumption about the relative speed of adjustment
of prices and output, Keynes regarded supply as essentially passive, expanding
or contracting as demand expanded or contracted, subject only to the proviso
that employment is less than “full,” which he deﬁned as the point at which an
increase in aggregate demand would call forth no additional workers willing to
7 The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp.
90, 96, and 114.
8 Ibid., pp. 62 and 135.
9 Ibid., pp. 166 and 199.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
work at the wage offered. This leads him to regard aggregate supply as given
simply by aggregate demand, or
YS = YD, (3)
and the level of aggregate supply and demand as affecting not a price but solely
employment.
If we regard the interest rate as ﬁxed, along with other prices, then equations
(1) and (3) deﬁne the famous Keynesian “multiplier” (attributed by Keynes to
Richard Kahn). For a simple version, assume that the consumption function is
linear:
C = a + bY, (4)










[a + I(r)]. (5)
The multiplier is 1/(1 − b), which, given that b is between zero and unity,
is necessarily greater than unity. The multiplicand, (a + I), came to be termed
“autonomous” spending, i.e., spending not dependent on the level of income. In
addition, once government was introduced into the analysis, autonomous spend-
ing was regarded as including not only autonomous consumption spending (a)
and investment (I) but also government spending.
Equations (1) and (3) deﬁne also the equally famous “Keynesian cross,”
which has been reproduced in literally hundreds of textbooks in the past half
century and is reproduced here in Figure 1.
The graph makes clear the key importance of the “fundamental psycholog-
ical law” that the marginal propensity to consume is less than unity. If it were
unity, the YD line would parallel the YS line and there would be either no or
an inﬁnite number of equilibrium positions, according as the two parallel lines
were distinct or identical. If it exceeded unity, the YD line would slope more
steeply than the YS line, and any point of intersection would be an unstable
equilibrium position. Because it slopes less steeply, the intersection at YO is
a stable equilibrium. If output were temporarily higher than YO, employers
would be making losses, since the aggregate supply price would exceed ag-
gregate demand, and would seek to contract output. Conversely, if output were
temporarily lower than YO, employers would be making proﬁts and would seek
to expand.
If, for whatever reason, investment were to increase from IO to I0
O, the YD
line would shift to Y0
D and the new equilibrium would shift to Y0
O. At YF, the
point of full employment, the process would end, and “the crude quantity theory
of money,” which is the particular object of Keynes’s scorn and derision—no
doubt because of his long earlier adherence to it—“is fully satisﬁed.”10
10 Ibid., p. 289.M. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 11





YS = YD  YD
YD = C + IO
YD = C + IO
+
Marvelously simple. A key that apparently unlocks the mystery of
long-continued unemployment: inadequate autonomous spending or too low a
propensity to consume. Increase either, or both, being careful simply not to go
too far, and full employment could be attained. What a wonderful prescription:
for consumers, spend more out of your income, and your income will rise;
for governments, spend more, and aggregate income will rise by a multiple of
your additional spending; tax less, and consumers will spend more with the
same result. Though Keynes himself, and even more, his disciples, produced
much more sophisticated and subtle versions of the theory, this simple version
contains the essence of its great appeal to non-economists and especially gov-
ernments. Here was one of the most famous and respected economists in the
world informing governments that the way to full employment was paved with
higher spending and lower taxes. What more attractive advice could politicians
wish for? Long regarded public vices turned into public virtues!
Marvelously simple, yes. But also simply marvelous. How could a position
such as YO in Figure 1 be regarded as a long-term equilibrium—as was implied
in the claim that the theory was “general”? At that point, men and machines12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
are idle. Would not the excess supply of men and machines exert downward
pressures on the prices of both? Yes, said Keynes, but, if effective, that would
be accompanied by lower money prices of output that would cancel the lower
money wages and money cost of capital, so that real wages and the real cost
of capital would be unaffected—which is why Keynes expressed all aggregate
magnitudes in “wage-units.” Hence, said Keynes, ﬂexible wages and prices
would do no good. Far better to operate directly on spending.
Of course, Keynes recognized that changes in prices, interest rates, and
quantity of money did have effects that provided alternative avenues of escape
from the so-called “underemployment equilibrium.” At best, it was a transitory
equilibrium position, the existence of which would set in motion self-corrective
forces. But Keynes tended to rule out these alternative avenues of escape as of
no practical signiﬁcance because of his empirical judgment that prices, wages,
and interest rates were highly sluggish. Indeed, some commentators on Keynes
maintain that he deliberately overstated his case in order to shock the economics
profession into paying attention—a tactic that is common to every innovator,
whether it be of an idea or a product.
Only one alternative avenue of adjustment is explicitly present in equa-
tions (1) and (2)—via the interest rate and the quantity of money. This avenue,
analyzed at some length in the General Theory, and found wanting to produce,
by itself, a full employment equilibrium, also was rapidly incorporated in an
alternative, more sophisticated graphical representation of the Keynesian sys-
tem developed almost simultaneously by John Hicks and Roy Harrod.11 Figure
2 presents Hicks’s IS-LM version, which very quickly became the orthodox
version.
In this diagram, the vertical axis is the interest rate. The horizontal axis is
income expressed in wage-units, so that it is also output and employment. The
IS curve traces equation (5), i.e., it shows the combinations of interest rate and
output that would satisfy equation (1): the higher the interest rate, the lower
investment and hence income, and conversely, which is why the IS curve has
a negative slope. Put differently, it shows the combinations of interest rate and
output at which the amount some people wish to invest is equal to the amount
other people wish to save, which is what explains the S in IS. But note that the
accommodation of saving to investment is produced not by the direct effect of
the interest rate on saving, but by the effect of the level of income on saving,
via the propensity to consume.
The LM curve traces equation (2) for a ﬁxed quantity of money. Here, the
higher the interest rate, the lower the quantity of money that the public would
want to hold for a given income, and hence the higher income must be in order
11 John R. Hicks, “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’: A Suggested Interpretation,” Economet-
rica, vol. 5 (April 1937), pp. 147–59; Roy F. Harrod, “Mr. Keynes and Traditional Theory,”
Econometrica, vol. 5 (January 1937), pp. 74–86.M. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 13











for the actual quantity of money to be willingly held. Hence the positive slope
of the LM curve.
The intersection of the IS and LM curve at YO is the counterpart of the
intersection of the aggregate demand and supply curves in Figure 1 at YO. Sim-
ilarly, the IS0 curve is the counterpart of the Y0
O curve in Figure 1, reﬂecting a
higher level of investment. It is the IS curve moved to the right by the change
in income assumed to be produced by the increase in investment—the change
in investment times the investment multiplier.
What is new in Figure 2 are the LM curves. Each LM curve is for a speciﬁc
quantity of money: the LM curve for M = MO, the (LM)0 curve for M = M0
O,
which is larger than MO. For the community to hold the larger quantity of
money willingly, either the interest rate must be lower for a given income or
income higher for a given interest rate, which is why the (LM)0 curve is to the
right of the LM curve.
The IS curve in the diagram embodies a possible Keynesian escape from
underemployment via increases in investment (or, more generally, autonomous
spending including government spending). Let autonomous spending be high
enough so that the IS curve intersects the LM curve at point F, and full em-
ployment would be attained with the initial quantity of money.
The LM curve offers an alternative escape via the quantity of money. Let
the quantity of money be large enough so that the LM curve intersects the14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 An Extreme IS-LM Diagram with Perfectly Elastic
Liquidity Preference and Inelastic Investment
IS curve at point F0, and full employment would be attained with the initial
marginal efﬁciency of capital schedule.
Keynes and his followers rejected this possibility as highly unrealistic,
largely on the alleged empirical grounds that (1) private autonomous expen-
ditures were little affected by changes in the interest rate while (2) there was
a ﬂoor to the interest rate at which the community would be willing to hold
assets other than money, so that, in the neighborhood of this ﬂoor, the quantity
of money the community would be willing to hold would be highly sensitive
to the interest rate: in short, a low elasticity of investment, but a high elasticity
of liquidity preference, with respect to the interest rate.
Figure 3 shows an extreme version of these assumptions: perfectly inelastic
investment and perfectly elastic liquidity preference. We are back to the Keynes-
ian cross of Figure 1. No changes in the quantity of money can produce a full
employment equilibrium. This LM curve depicts a “liquidity trap,” of which
Keynes wrote, “whilst the limiting case might become practically important in
future, I know of no example of it hitherto. Indeed, owing to the unwillingness
of most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts of long term, there hasM. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 15
Figure 4 A Less-Extreme Liquidity Trap
not been much opportunity for a test.”12 Of course, it is not necessary to go to
this extreme to generate Keynesian unemployment equilibria, and Keynes and
his followers did not, though some of the more enthusiastic of his disciples
came very close during the high tide of the Keynesian revolution. It is only
necessary to suppose a highly inelastic IS curve, and a highly elastic LM curve,
as in Figure 4. In this version, a negative interest rate would be required for a
full employment equilibrium. The Keynesians ruled out this possibility by the
assumption of given prices.13
The avenue of adjustment that is not explicitly allowed for in either equa-
tions (1) and (2) or in the more sophisticated IS-LM diagram is the level of
prices and wages. As already noted, a Keynesian position of underemployment
equilibrium means downward pressure on wages and prices. Keynes explicitly
12 The General Theory, p. 207.
13 The interest rate that is relevant to investment is the “real” interest rate, i.e., the nominal
rate of interest less the rate of inﬂation, and the “real” interest rate has often been negative.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
recognized that a change in real wages would affect employment by altering
both the supply and the demand for labor.14 However, he ruled out that avenue
of escape on the grounds that prices and wages would tend to change pari-passu
leaving real wages largely unchanged—not a bad empirical approximation for
the kind of major disturbances, such as the Great Depression, whose origin and
cure Keynes was seeking. Keynes discussed two other effects of changes in the
level of prices and wages. The ﬁrst is on the real quantity of money, and thence
the rate of interest. A lower level of prices is equivalent to a higher quantity
of money, and like an increase in the quantity of money would shift the LM
curve to the right. The second is the effect of a lower rate of interest on the
consumption function, an effect that has come to be called the Keynes effect.
The lower the interest rate, the higher the capital value of a given stream of
income—such as rent on a piece of land, or coupons on a bond. Hence, a lower
interest rate increases the wealth of the community. The higher the wealth, the
less pressure to add to wealth via savings, and hence the higher is likely to be
the average and marginal propensity to consume at any income.
Though Keynes recognized the existence of these avenues of adjustment,
he largely dismissed them on empirical grounds. Sluggishness of price move-
ments had pride of place, but inelasticity of investment and elasticity of liquidity
preference with respect to the interest rate and inelasticity of consumption with
respect to wealth were also important.
A third effect of a pari-passu change in prices and wages, which came to
be known as the “Pigou” effect, was not discussed explicitly by Keynes. The
lower the price level, the higher the real value of the ﬁxed quantity of money. In
principle, there is no limit to the real value of a ﬁxed nominal quantity of money,
and hence no limit to the wealth of a community, and accordingly, no limit to
the extent to which the IS curve could be shifted to the right by the reduction in
the incentive to save.15 There is much dispute about the empirical importance
of this effect. I personally regard it as minor. However, on the purely abstract
theoretical level of the General Theory, it conclusively demonstrates that there
is no such ﬂaw in the price system as Keynes professed to demonstrate. His
position of underemployment equilibrium, whatever else it might be, was not
a long-run equilibrium position that set in motion no effective forces tending
toward full employment.
What difference does this abstract analysis make? Is it not simply arguing
about how many angels can dance on the point of a pin? The answer is that it
destroys Keynes’s most striking and radical claim made in the ﬁrst paragraph
of the General Theory: that what he called the “classical economics,” and, in
14 See, for example, ibid., p. 289.
15 For a fuller theoretical analysis of (a) the possibility of a negative equilibrium interest
rate, and (b) the Keynes and Pigou effects, see Milton Friedman, Price Theory (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 313–21.M. Friedman: John Maynard Keynes 17
particular, the quantity theory of money, were fundamentally fallacious, “that
the postulates of the classical theory are applicable to a special case only and
not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting part
of the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the
special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the
economic society in which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is
misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience.”16
If this extreme claim is wrong, Keynes’s theory becomes not a theory of
“equilibrium” but at best a theory of disequilibrium, readily encompassed in
the earlier orthodoxy. Conventional wisdom prior to the General Theory had
always recognized that ﬂuctuations existed, and that periods of widespread
unemployment did occur from time to time. But it regarded these as responses
to changes in circumstances, plus rigidities in prices, wages, and other variables
that impeded rapid adjustment to the new circumstances. And, indeed, conven-
tional economic wisdom has by now come to regard the Keynesian theory as
a theory of disequilibrium, which provides a useful way to analyze the process
of adjustment to changes in circumstances in a world of relatively rigid prices
and wages. It should be added that there does remain a signiﬁcant number of
respected economists who continue to regard Keynes’s contribution as provid-
ing a truly general theory fully justifying his initial claims, and continue to
regard him as having demolished the so-called classical theory.17
There remains the twin questions of why Keynes, who described himself
in the preface to the German edition as having been “a priest of” the English
classical quantity theory tradition, regarded it as incompetent to explain the
persistence of high unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s, and of how those
of us who disagree with him reconcile that remarkable phenomenon with the
earlier theory. The key to the answer to both questions is the interpretation of
monetary developments, and particularly monetary policy in the 1930s. Con-
sider ﬁrst the situation in the U.S. By contrast with Britain, the 1920s were
a period of general prosperity, high employment, and relatively stable prices.
There was no reason to question the importance of monetary policy. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve System in the United States took for itself much of the credit
for the good performance of the economy. But then came the Great Depression.
Its initial phase, from 1929 to late 1930, had all the characteristics of a garden-
variety recession, though somewhat more severe than most, and, indeed, had it
ended in early 1930, or even early 1931, as it showed some signs of doing, it
would have gone down in history in that way, not as a major contraction, let
alone Great Depression. But the second phase, from the end of 1930 to 1933,
was very different. It was marked by a succession of banking crises, and the
16 Ibid., p. 1.
17 The most prominent of this group are the late Joan Robinson, the late Nicholas Kaldor,
in Britain, and Professor Robert Eisner, in the United States.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
veritable collapse of the banking system leading to an unprecedented “bank
holiday” in March 1933, during which all the banks of the country—including
the Federal Reserve Banks themselves—were closed for business. When the
holiday ended and “sound banks” reopened, they numbered only two-thirds as
many as were in existence in 1929. This sequence of events was accompanied
by a disastrous increase in unemployment, and major declines in prices, wages,
and national income both in current and constant prices. From 1929 to 1933,
“money income fell 53 percent and real income 36 percent . . . . Per capita
real income in 1933 was almost the same as in the depression year of 1908, a
quarter of a century earlier . . . . At the trough of the depression one person
was unemployed for every three employed.”18 And what happened in the
United States was duplicated—the banking disaster partly excepted—around
the world.
To Keynes and many of his contemporaries, this sequence of events seemed
a clear contradiction of the earlier theory and of the efﬁcacy of monetary policy.
They tended then, as many still do, to regard monetary policy as operating via
interest rates. Short-term interest rates in the United States had fallen drastically
during the contraction. In particular, the discount rate charged by the Federal
Reserve Banks on loans to banks that were members of the Federal Reserve
System was steadily reduced from 6 percent in 1929 to 1.5 percent by the fall
of 1931, though it was then abruptly increased to 3.5 percent in response to
Britain’s departure from gold in September 1931, and was still 2.5 percent in
early 1933. Judged in these terms, monetary policy was “easy,” yet it appar-
ently had been powerless to stem the contraction, giving rise to widespread
apprehension that monetary policy was like a string: you could pull on it, but
not push on it, i.e., monetary policy could check inﬂation but could not offset
contraction.
From another, and I would argue far more signiﬁcant, point of view, mon-
etary policy was anything but “easy.” That point of view regards monetary
policy as operating via the quantity of money. In terms of annual averages, the
quantity of money in the United States fell by one-third from 1929 to 1933—
by 2 percent from 1929 to 1930, just before the onset of the ﬁrst banking
crisis, and by a further 32 percent from 1930 to 1933. Data on the quantity of
money were not published regularly at that time and were not readily available
even with some lag, whereas interest rates were readily and contemporarily
available—both effect and reinforcement of the tendency to interpret monetary
policy in terms of the interest rate rather than the quantity of money.
Keynes may well not have known what was happening to the quantity
of money, though if he had, he would also have known that “[a]t all times
18 Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–
1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963),
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throughout the 1929–33 contraction, alternative policies were available to the
[Federal Reserve] System by which it could have kept the stock of money
from falling, and indeed could have increased it at almost any desired rate.”
Far from demonstrating, as Keynes concluded, that monetary policy is impotent,
“[t]he contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary
forces.”19 The contraction continued and deepened not because there were no
equilibrating forces within the economy but because the economy was subjected
to a series of shocks succeeding one another: a ﬁrst banking crisis beginning in
the fall of 1930, a second beginning in the spring of 1931, Britain’s departure
from gold in September 1931, and the ﬁnal banking crisis beginning in Janu-
ary 1933—all accompanied by a decline in the quantity of money of 7 percent
from 1930 to 1931, 17 percent from 1931 to 1932, and 12 percent from 1932
to 1933.
Even after the end of the contraction and the start of revival in 1933,
the shocks continued and impeded recovery: major legislative measures during
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal that interfered with market adjustments
and generated uncertainty within the business community, although some of
them, particularly the enactment of federal insurance of bank deposits, reas-
sured the community about the safety and stability of the ﬁnancial institutions;
then ill-advised monetary measures in 1936 that halted the rapid rise that had
been occurring in the quantity of money and produced an absolute decline from
early 1937 to early 1938 that exacerbated if it did not produce the accompanying
severe cyclical decline.
Keynes’s readiness to interpret the U.S. experience as evidence of the
impotence of monetary policy was greatly strengthened by the British expe-
rience. By contrast with the U.S., the 1920s was a period of stagnation and
high unemployment that the severe worldwide contraction beginning in 1929
intensiﬁed. However, the contraction ended earlier in Britain than in the U.S.,
shortly after Britain left the gold standard and thereby cut its monetary link
with the U.S. Here, too, a succession of shocks played an important role: the
end of World War I and demobilization; the pressure to return to gold at the
prewar parity, which required internal deﬂation; the return in 1925 to gold at
a parity that overvalued the pound sterling, particularly after France returned
to gold at a parity that undervalued the franc; and, ﬁnally, the shock waves
that spread from the U.S. after 1929. The effect of steady deﬂationary pressure
was reinforced by “an unemployment insurance scheme that paid beneﬁts that
were high relative to wages available subject to few restrictions . . . . Although
a few interwar observers saw clearly the effects of unemployment insurance,
Keynes and his followers did not.”20
19 Ibid., pp. 693 and 300.
20 Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis A. Kochin, “Searching for an Explanation of Unemploy-
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4. KEYNES’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE
In judging Keynes’s overall inﬂuence on public policy, it is necessary to distin-
guish his bequest to technical economics from his bequest to politics. Keynes’s
bequest to technical economics was strongly positive. His bequest to politics,
in my opinion, was not. Yet I conjecture that his bequest to politics has had
far more inﬂuence on the shape of today’s world than his bequest to technical
economics. In particular, it has contributed greatly to the proliferation of over-
grown governments increasingly concerned with every phase of their citizens’
daily lives.21
I can best indicate what I regard to be Keynes’s bequest to politics by quot-
ing from his famous letter to Professor Friedrich von Hayek praising Hayek’s
Road to Serfdom. The part generally quoted is from the opening paragraph of
the letter: “In my opinion it is a grand book . . . . [M]orally and philosophi-
cally I ﬁnd myself in agreement with virtually the whole of it; and not only in
agreement with it, but in a deeply moved agreement.”
The part I want to direct attention to comes later:
“I should therefore conclude your theme rather differently. I should say that
what we want is not no planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say
that we almost certainly want more. But the planning should take place in a
community in which as many people as possible, both leaders and followers
wholly share your own moral position. Moderate planning will be safe if those
carrying it out are rightly orientated in their own minds and hearts to the moral
issue.
“What we need therefore, in my opinion, is not a change in our economic
programmes, which would only lead in practice to disillusion with the results
of your philosophy; but perhaps even the contrary, namely, an enlargement of
them . . . . No, what we need is the restoration of right moral thinking—a
return to proper moral values in our social philosophy . . . . Dangerous acts can
be done safely in a community which thinks and feels rightly, which would be
the way to hell if they were executed by those who think and feel wrongly.”22
Keynes was exceedingly effective in persuading a broad group—econo-
mists, policymakers, government ofﬁcials, and interested citizens—of the two
concepts implicit in his letter to Hayek: ﬁrst, the public interest concept of
government; second, the benevolent dictatorship concept that all will be well if
only good men are in power. Clearly, Keynes’s agreement with “virtually the
21 The rest of this preface up to the ﬁnal paragraph is drawn largely from my “Comment on
Leland Yeager’s Paper on the Keynesian Heritage,” in The Keynesian Heritage, a symposium by
Leland Yeager, Milton Friedman, and Karl Brunner, Center Symposia Series CS–16 (Rochester,
N.Y.: Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Graduate School of Management,
University of Rochester, 1985), pp. 12–18.
22 Donald Moggridge, ed., John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings, Vol. XXVII:
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whole” of the Road to Serfdom did not extend to the chapter titled “Why the
Worst Get on Top.”
Keynes believed that economists (and others) could best contribute to the
improvement of society by investigating how to manipulate the levers actually
or potentially under control of the political authorities so as to achieve desir-
able ends, and then persuading benevolent civil servants and elected ofﬁcials to
follow their advice. The role of voters is to elect persons with the right moral
values to ofﬁce and then let them run the country.
From an alternative point of view, economists (and others) can best con-
tribute to the improvement of society by investigating the framework of political
institutions that will best assure that an individual government employee or
elected ofﬁcial who, in Adam Smith’s words, “intends only his own gain . . .
is . . . led by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his
intention,” and then persuading the voters that it is in their self-interest to
adopt such a framework. The task, that is, is to do for the political market what
Adam Smith so largely did for the economic market.
Keynes’s view has been enormously inﬂuential—if only by strongly rein-
forcing a pre-existing attitude. Many economists have devoted their efforts to
social engineering of precisely the kind that Keynes engaged in and advised
others to engage in. And it is far from clear that they have been wrong to do
so. We must act within the system as it is. We may regret that government
has the powers it does; we may try our best as citizens to persuade our fellow
citizens to eliminate many of those powers; but so long as they exist, it is
often, though by no means always, better that they be exercised efﬁciently than
inefﬁciently. Moreover, given that the system is what it is, it is entirely proper
for individuals to conform and promote their interests within it.
An approach that takes for granted that government employees and ofﬁcials
are acting as benevolent dictators to promote in a disinterested way what they
regard as the public’s conception of the “general interest” is bound to contribute
to an expansion in governmental intervention in the economy—regardless of
the economic theory employed. A monetarist no less than a Keynesian interpre-
tation of economic ﬂuctuations can lead to a ﬁne-tuning approach to economic
policy.
The persuasiveness of Keynes’s view was greatly enhanced in Britain by
historical experience, as well as by the example Keynes himself set. Britain
retains an aristocratic structure—one in which noblesse oblige was more than
a meaningless catchword. What has changed are the criteria for admission to
the aristocracy—if not to a complete meritocracy, at least some way in that
direction. Moreover, Britain’s nineteenth-century laissez-faire policy produced
a largely incorruptible civil service, with limited scope for action, but with
great powers of decision within those limits. It also produced a law-obedient
citizenry that was responsive to the actions of the elected ofﬁcials operating in
turn under the inﬂuence of the civil service. The welfare state of the twentieth22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
century has almost completely eroded both elements of this heritage. But that
was not true when Keynes was forming his views, and during most of his
public activity.
Keynes’s own experience was also inﬂuential, particularly to economists.
He set an example of a brilliant scholar who participated actively and effectively
in the formulation of public policy—both through inﬂuencing public opinion
and as a technical expert called on by the government for advice. He set an
example also of a public-spirited and largely disinterested participant in the
political process. And it is not irrelevant that he gained worldwide fame, and
a private fortune, in the process.
The situation was very different in the United States. The United States is
a democratic not an aristocratic society, as Tocqueville pointed out long ago. It
has no tradition of an incorruptible or able civil service. Quite the contrary. The
spoils system formed public attitudes far more than a supposedly non-political
civil service. And it did so even after it had become very much emasculated in
practice. As a result, Keynes’s political bequest has been less effective in the
United States than in Britain, which partly explains, I believe, why the “public
choice” revolution in the analysis of politics occurred in the United States. Yet
even in the United States, Keynes’s political bequest has been tremendously
effective. Certainly most writing by economists on public policy—as opposed
to scientiﬁc and technical economics—has been consistent with it. Economists,
myself included, have sought to discover how to manipulate the levers of power
more effectively, and to persuade—or educate—governmental ofﬁcials regarded
as seeking to serve the public interest.
I conclude that Keynes’s political bequest has done far more harm than
his economic bequest and this for two reasons. First, whatever the economic
analysis, benevolent dictatorship is likely sooner or later to lead to a totalitarian
society. Second, Keynes’s economic theories appealed to a group far broader
than economists primarily because of their link to his political approach. Here
again, Keynes, in his letter to Hayek, said it better than I can: “Moderate
planning will be safe if those carrying it out are rightly orientated in their own
minds and hearts to the moral issue. This is in fact already true of some of
them. But the curse is that there is also an important section who could almost
be said to want planning not in order to enjoy its fruits but because morally they
hold ideas exactly the opposite of yours [i.e., Hayek’s], and wish to serve not
God but the devil. Reading the New Statesman and Nation one sometimes feels
that those who write there, while they cannot safely oppose moderate planning,
are really hoping in their hearts that it will not succeed; and so prejudice more
violent action. They fear that if moderate measures are sufﬁciently successful,
this will allow a reaction in what you think the right and they think the wrong
moral direction. Perhaps I do them an injustice; but perhaps I do not.”
Keynes did not let this analysis prevent him from serving until his death
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inﬂuencing the moral views of its editors and writers. I regard Keynes’s analysis
as indicating that the key problem is not how to achieve a moral regeneration
but rather how either to frustrate what Keynes regards as “bad morals,” or to
construct a political framework in which those “bad morals” serve not only
the private but also the public interest, just as, in the economic market, private
greed is converted to public service.
The literature on Keynes and on the General Theory is by now immense.
Of the books speciﬁcally devoted to Keynes’s life, two stand out: the initial
authorized biography by his student and disciple, Roy F. Harrod, The Life of
John Maynard Keynes (1951); and the more recent multi-volume biography by
Robert J. A. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 1: Hopes Betrayed, 1883–
1920 (London: Macmillan, 1983), and Vol. 2: The Economist as Prince, 1920–
1937 (London: Macmillan, 1988). The Collected Writings of John Maynard
Keynes have been published under the auspices of the Royal Economic Society
in 29 volumes (Macmillan, 1971 to 1982), with a ﬁnal Bibliography and Index
yet to come. This splendid collection includes not only his major work but also
his published articles on economics and politics, many previously unpublished
items, including letters, ofﬁcial memoranda and notes, and the like.